SHORT STUDY OF ETHICS. By Charles F. D'Arcy, B.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

If a book is known by the abundance of its fruits, Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics" must take a high place in the philosophical literature of our own generation. Here is another group of ethical studies which owns the same stalk as Dewey's "Outlines," Mackenzie's "Manual," and others. Their author is thoroughly at home in recent English contributions to idealistic philosophy, and brings much critical ability and a fresh and interesting style to the task he has set before himself.

His treatment differs from that of his predecessors chiefly in the prominent place assigned to the discussion of the metaphysical questions, which he rightly holds are involved in any thorough investigation of ethical problems and the comparatively subordinate place assigned to the criticism of rival schemes. He announces at the outset that philosophy, whether successful or not, is inevitable, reminding one of Mr. Bradley's epigram that "metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct." Accordingly, he takes the risk of repelling the beginner by devoting the first seventy pages to a statement of the philosophical basis of ethics. Nor does he spare the student who consents to follow him in this swift analysis. Within these limits he condenses a discussion of the relation of the subject to the Cosmos, of Will to Nature and of the Divine to the Individual Mind, ending with twelve pages on the proofs of the Being of God and the "Idea of Organic Unity as applied to Society." It need hardly be said that a treatment of this kind gives his conclusions a dogmatic colouring, which they might have lost if the writer had felt himself at leisure to tone them into harmony with his fundamental assumptions as to the nature of human life and mind. No reviewer, however, is likely to quarrel seriously with a writer for condensing his argument. It is a more serious matter when the doctrine, whether stated dogmatically or not, is itself open to exception. This seems to me to be the case in respect to one important contention which is here put forward and pervades more or less the whole succeeding argument. The author is perfectly clear in his view that the Cosmos is penetrated with mind, and therefore presupposes the subject. But, withheld apparently by the fear of Pantheism on the one hand and of the doctrine that the self is a mere correlative of nature on the other, he here stops

short and denies that the subject in the same way presupposes the Cosmos. But there are different kinds of Pantheism, and it is not necessary to reduce the self to a mere correlative of the object in maintaining that a subject implies a Cosmos just as truly as a Cosmos a subject. The author takes refuge in the Kantian doctrine of a transcendental ego, which "can abstract from the concrete and remain still the same self-identical subject as before" (p. 14). What is the writer's conception of such a self-identical subject? Has it thoughts and feelings? If it has, these are its Cosmos; if it has not, what is it?

If this dualism stood alone it would be of less importance, but Mr. D'Arcy is too much penetrated by his own speculative ideas to leave it here. It reappears when we come to the question of the Cosmos of wills. He admits that there cannot be a society of wills any more than a world of objects, except to an individual mind, but there may apparently be an individual mind and will into which the minds and wills of others do not enter as constituent elements. We represent other subjects to ourselves "symbolically" (it is not very clear what the symbol is), but their existence and unity are guaranteed to us, not by the constitution of our own nature as social beings, but by the Divine Mind. The objection here is the same as before. What is the individual will apart from the wills of others? The *diversity* of wills is symbolized by the externality of our bodies to one another; their *unity* is given in every moral or, for the matter of that, immoral act. Does Mr. D'Arcy deny this? does he really believe that because there is no material sensorium in the body politic corresponding to the brain in the animal organism there is no civic spirit, no general purpose, no *community* of wills? His whole doctrine of a common good contradicts any such assumption. And if we grant the existence of the general will, what is the relation of the individual will to it? What would the individual will be without it? Would it not be the same abstract self-identity—the same nonentity—as the subject without the Cosmos? It is this fundamental identity to which the idealist means to call attention by emphasizing the "organic view" of Society. It is not a question of finding interesting parallels between the animal organism and political society, but of realizing this essential unity of wills. Mr. D'Arcy, of course, does so elsewhere, as, for instance, in his excellent chapter upon the "Determination of the Principle." But had he done so more explicitly at the outset he would have saved himself from appearing to accept (p. 58)

the most vicious element in Mr. Kidd's clever book, the assumption that reason is essentially unsocial. One cannot avoid a suspicion that, as it is his fear of Pantheism that is at the root of his speculative dualism, so here it is his justifiable jealousy of a purely naturalistic Ethics which is the obstacle in the way of his acceptance of a thorough-going idealism. The danger to the religious view of morality is, of course, all the other way. If the individual will is shut up within itself and can only enter into communion with other wills symbolically, how are we to conceive of its relation to the Divine? Can the individual soul partake of this also only through symbols, and if so, what meaning can we attach to a symbol of that of which we have no real knowledge? Mr. D'Arcy quotes Scripture. The root of the present matter is contained in the scriptural question "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Mr. D'Arcy has shown himself an appreciative student of Green's "Prolegomena." To the present writer much, both of the metaphysics and the psychology of that great work, seems to possess little more than an historical interest, but the Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation are as fresh and vital to-day as when they were delivered in 1879. A book like the present shows how important it is, in the attempt to carry on and develop idealistic philosophy in England, to supplement the more individualistic view of the Prolegomena with the doctrine of the general will as developed in the Lectures.

I regret that my limits do not permit me to do justice to the admirable style and still more admirable spirit of this hand-book by quotations, and that this review has been mainly critical. The book itself is chiefly constructive, and has suggestions for the student of ethics at whatever stage of advancement.

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LONDON.

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. 454.

The doctrine that Mr. D'Arcy rejects is made the head of the corner by Professor Mackenzie in his able work on Social Philosophy. Throughout two brilliant chapters (III. and IV.) he exerts